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THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN ITS THIRD CENTURY:
THREE WISCONSIN PIECES TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PUZZLE
PETER

K. ROFES°

Several months back, my colleague Gordon Hylton-an historian
through and through-was explaining to me how the idea for this
symposium began as something of an excuse for historians to .gather in
celebration of Wisconsin's sesquicentennial.
As Professor Hylton
recounted the story that day, it was clear that something had gone terribly
wrong, as the original idea for the event somehow unraveled into one that
encouraged participation from those of us who lack the credentials to call
ourselves historians. Given that original conception of this colloquium,
it is hardly surprising that my distinguished co-presenters have important
insights to share about both the legal and constitutional history of
Wisconsin throughout the second half of the nineteenth and the first half
of the twentieth centuries and the impact of that history on our nation's
legal culture and institutions.
I have no such insights. Instead, my lens will be focused on more
recent developments, developments of the past decade that reflect the
enduring role Wisconsin and a variety of communities throughout
Wisconsin continue to play in the evolution of the law of the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and in the wider
political and social struggles that shape, and are shaped by, First
Amendment law. In particular, my focus will be on contributions
Wisconsin has made to our ongoing national conversation, about the extent
to which states are free to punish crimes of hate, universities are free to
deter harassment on their campuses, and municipalities are free to depict
their religious heritages on municipal seals.

*
Director of Part-time Legal Education and Associate Professor of Law,
Marquette University Law School.
B.A., Brandeis University; A.M., Harvard
University; J.D., Columbia University School of Law. I am grateful to the editorial
board of the Wisconsin Law Review, and especially to Chris Dickerson and Randy
Fieldhack, for the opportunity to participate in this symposium; to Professor Gordon
Baldwin, for encouragement in this and other professional endeavors; and to Joanne Lipo
Zovic, for cheerful and useful research assistance right up to the day she entered the
hospital to deliver her fourth child.
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I. COMBATTING CRIMES OF HATE THROUGH ENHANCED PENALTIES

In the mid-eighties, several highly-publicized incidents of vandalism
unfolded in the Milwaukee metropolitan area. An African-American
family about to settle in Brown Deer had its home painted with racist
comments.' A new synagogue in Mequon had its building defaced with
Nazi symbols and slogans.2 The local Jewish Community Center
experienced a similar fate.3 Each of these acts of intimidation constituted
a crime against property under Wisconsin law. Nevertheless, because the
damage caused by these acts in monetary terms was modest, the crimes
were treated as minor misdemeanors worthy only of minor punishment.
In response to these and similar acts of intimidation around the state,
a coalition of organizations petitioned the Legislature to amend the
Wisconsin Statutes. In 1987, that effort culminated in the enactment of
section 939.645.1 Stripped to the basics, the new law provided enhanced
maximum penalties for individuals who commit any of a wide variety of
crimes against person or property if such individuals are found to have
intentionally selected the person against whom the crime is committed or
the property damaged by the crime "because of" the race, religion, color,
disability, sexual orientation, national origin, or ancestry of the person or
owner/occupant of the property. 5 Put more colloquially, the Wisconsin
Legislature authorized judges to apply a more stringent punishment to
1.

See Gregory D. Stanford, Racial Slurs Greet Black in Brown Deer,
J., Aug. 3, 1987, at BI.
The comments scrawled include the phrases
"Leave Niggers" and "White Mans [sic] Territory!!" Id.
2.
See Linda Steiner, Swastikas at Temple Stir Angry Reaction, MILWAUKEE J.,
June 18, 1984, at BI. Three-foot high swastikas were found painted in red on a wall and
the name sign of Congregation Beth El Ner Tamid less than a month after the synagogue
opened. Id.
3.
See Alicia Armstrong, Vandals Strike at Jewish Center, MILWAUKEE J., July
27, 1985, at Al. Nine swastikas, again painted in red, were found spray-painted on the
outside of the downtown Milwaukee Jewish Community Center the same day the words
"Dirty Jews" were found painted on the outside of a nearby restaurant owned and
operated by a prominent member of Milwaukee's Jewish community.
4.
See 1987 Wis. Laws 1233 (codified at Wis. STAT. § 939.645 (1987-1988)).
5.
As originally enacted, the central portion of the statute provided as follows:
(1) If a person does all of the following, the penalties for the underlying crime
are increased as provided in sub. (2):
(a) Commits a crime under chs. 939 to 948.
(b) Intentionally selects the person against whom the crime under
par. (a) is committed or selects the property which is damaged or
otherwise affected by the crime under par. (a) because of the race,
religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or
ancestry of that person or the owner or occupant of that property.
MILWAUKEE

WIs. STAT.

§ 939.645.
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convicted criminals who select the targets of their crimes on the basis of
race, religion, or any of the other specifically enumerated categories. The
Legislature justified its decision with the cluster of reasons traditionally

put forward to justify criminal punishment,6 as well as with a few
reasons distinctive to the particular act of selecting people or property as
targets of crime for reasons of race, religion, and the like. Among the

latter was the contention that such crimes represent a greater threat to a
peaceful and secure society because they perpetuate a climate of hate and

fear among society's identifiable groups and incite retaliatory crimes of
a similar nature. 7 On the surface, the legislative decision seemed
eminently reasonable and uncontroversial, deeming worthy of more
stringent punishment conduct deemed more harmful to a safe and ordered

society.
Two years later, in the autumn of 1989, an episode unfolded outside
a Kenosha apartment complex that would land this new statute in our
nation's highest court and make it one of the most closely watched cases
of the Supreme Court's 1992-1993 term.8 A group of African-American
teenage males was discussing a scene from the movie "Mississippi
Burning," a scene in which a white man beats up an African-American
youngster who had been praying. Nineteen-year-old Todd Mitchell
inquired of his companions: "Do you all feel hyped up to move on some
white people?" Shortly thereafter, Gregory Reddick, a fourteen-year-old
white male, approached the apartment complex, walking on the opposite
side of the street from the group. Observing Reddick, Mitchell said to
6.
For example, in its unsuccessful defense of the statute before the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, the State argued that a principal interest served by the enhancer was
"prevention of crime and preservation of order." Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 27,
State v. Mitchell, 169 Wis. 2d 153, 485 N.W.2d 807 (1992) (No. 90-2474-CR).
7.
A consistent theme running through governmental efforts to combat hate
crimes in Wisconsin and elsewhere is the quasi-empirical contention that each such crime
serves to destabilize communities more than the garden variety crime by poisoning the
culture among groups and triggering the next such hate crime. The State made such an
argument both to the Wisconsin Supreme Court-see id. at 36 (Such crimes constitute "a
greater threat to the peace and security ... because they promote an atmosphere of hate
and fear between identifiable categories of persons in our society. Not only might a
particular discrimination crime escalate to a larger conflict, but each such crime fosters
generalized fear and suspicion. ")-and to the Supreme Court of the United States-Brief
of Petitioner at 24, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (No. 92-515) (Such
crimes "are more likely than other crimes to provoke further crime in the form of
retaliatory crime or copycat crimes . . . . They invite imitation and retaliation because
they are directed not only toward the victim, but toward the victim's entire group.").
8.
The facts set forth in this paragraph are taken from Chief Justice Heffernan's
opinion for the majority in the Wisconsin Supreme Court as well as the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals opinion. See State v. Mitchell, 169 Wis. 2d 153, 158-59, 485 N.W.2d 807,
809 (1992); State v. Mitchell, 163 Wis. 2d 652, 658, 473 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 1991).
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the group "You all want to fuck somebody up? There goes a white boy;
go get him." Mitchell then counted to three and pointed his peers in
Reddick's direction. The group ran toward Reddick, beat him into a
coma, and stole his (British Knights) tennis shoes. One of the attackers
testified that when the group dispersed he thought Reddick was dead.
Todd Mitchell's role in the beating earned him, among other things,
a conviction for party to the crime of aggravated battery, a crime that
carried a maximum sentence of two years. 9 Nevertheless, because the
jury separately found that Mitchell had selected victim Reddick because
of Reddick's race, Circuit Court Judge Breitenbach sentenced Mitchell
to four years (out of a possible seven) for the aggravated battery. 10
Following unsuccessful efforts to obtain post-conviction relief in the trial
court and the invalidation of the statute on constitutional grounds in the
court of appeals, the case landed in the Wisconsin Supreme Court."
Arm-chair quarterbacks in our competitive culture often remark that
the measure of an athlete is how well he or she plays in the "big" games.
Something along the same lines can be said about judges. Todd
Mitchell's case was a "big" case, and it elicited big-game performances
from the three members of the court who wrote opinions.
Chief Justice Heffernan wrote for the five-member majority that
invalidated the penalty-enhancer statute and overturned the portion of
Mitchell's sentence that had been grounded in the statute. The nub of the
Chief Justice's constitutional analysis-an analysis that closely tracked the
argument contained in a recent law review article written by a Wisconsin
native and cited repeatedly by the Chief Justice throughout his majority
opinionl2-was essentially as follows: Because each of the crimes
included under the new penalty enhancer provision was already punishable
priorto the enactment of the enhancer, including the aggravated battery
for which Todd Mitchell was punished, all that the new penalty enhancer
law really punishes is evil thoughts, hateful thoughts, the intellectual,
emotional, and psychological prejudice that prompted Todd Mitchell to
choose Gregory Reddick as his victim. 3 Accordingly, Chief Justice
Heffernan concluded, the new law is invalid for that very reason; as he

9.

See id. at 159, 485 N.W.2d at 809; Wis.

STAT.

§§ 939.05, 940.19(lm)

(1987).

10.
See Mitchell, 169 Wis.2d at 159, 485 N.W.2d at 809.
11.
See id. at 159-60, 485 N.W.2d at 809-10.
12.
See Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words
Increase Your Sentence? Constitutionaland PolicyDilemmas of EthnicIntimidationLaws,
39 UCLA L. REv. 333 (1991). At important moments in the majority opinion, Chief
Justice Heffernan offers extensive selections from the Gellman article. See Mitchell, 169
Wis. 2d at 167 n.ll, 485 N.W.2d at 813 n.ll; id. at 174-75, 485 N.W.2d at 816.
13.
See id. at 164-70, 485 N.W.2d at 811-14.
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put it, "[p]unishment1 4 of one's thought, however repugnant the thought,
is unconstitutional."
But there was a second arrow in Chief Justice Heffernan's
constitutional quiver. The majority opinion also concluded that because
the new statute encourages the prosecution to introduce into evidence
defendant's hateful speech in an effort to demonstrate that the defendant
intentionally selected his victim on the basis of one of the protected
categories-precisely as the prosecution introduced Todd Mitchell's
"There goes a white boy; go get him" remark-the statute serves to
unconstitutionally chill the expression of hateful but nevertheless protected
15
expression.
Justices Abrahamson and Bablitch each dissented from the majority's
conclusion that the penalty enhancer clashed with First Amendment
principles. In a surprising role reversal, however, the dissent of Justice
Abrahamson was brief (occupying fewer than four pages in the Wisconsin
Reports) 6 while that of Justice Bablitch represented one of the most
extensive and impassioned of his judicial career."
Justice Abrahamson challenged the majority's contention that Todd
Mitchell was being punished for hateful thoughts or impolitic speech. She
maintained instead that Judge Breitenbach's sentence punished Mitchell
for precisely the kind of conduct that the Legislature deemed worthy of
enhanced punishment: the act of selecting Gregory Reddick as the victim
of crime on the basis of Reddick's race. As she put it, "this statute is a
prohibition on conduct, not on belief or expression. The statute does
nothing more than assign consequences to invidiously discriminatory acts
... . The enhanced punishment justly reflects the crime's enhanced
negative consequences on society . . . .The only chilling effect is on
lawless conduct."' 8
Justice Bablitch elaborated more fully on Justice Abrahamson's point
that the statute punished neither thought nor speech.' 9 But the bulk of
his dissent was spent demonstrating how the majority's analysis of the
penalty enhancer, taken at face value, would wipe out, on First
Amendment grounds, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and much
of the rest of American anti-discrimination law.'
For if the First
Amendment does not permit Wisconsin to punish an individual who
14.
Id. at 170, 485 N.W.2d at 814. Interestingly, Chief Justice Heffernan
neglected to cite any law that directly supported this important judicial ipse dixit.
15.
See id. at 172-76, 485 N.W.2d at 814-17.
16.
See id. at 178-82, 485 N.W.2d at 818-19 (Abrahamson, J.,dissenting).
17.
See id. at 182-210, 485 N.W.2d at 819-31 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
18.
Id. at 181, 485 N.W.2d at 819 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
19.
See id. at 183, 187-89, 485 N.W.2d at 819-20, 821-22.
See id. at 189-95, 485 N.W.2d at 822-25.
20.
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selects his crime victim "because of" the victim's race, Justice Bablitch
observed, the conclusion is inescapable that Congress is not permitted to
punish an employer who refuses to hire or promote an employee "because
of' the employee's race.21
The disagreement about the First Amendment implications of
Wisconsin's new penalty enhancer ultimately was not to be resolved by
the spirited conversation among Justices Heffernan, Abrahamson, and
Bablitch. Six months later, the nation's highest court announced that the
issues implicated by Todd Mitchell's case were sufficiently important to
devote its scarce resources to it.Y
And important it was. By this time, a range of other states had
amended their criminal codes to add penalty enhancer provisions similar
to that of Wisconsin.' The federal government sought to enact such a
law but, at this juncture, its efforts had fallen short in the Senate.'
Instead, Congress enacted a law requiring the Attorney General to
compile data "'about crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on
race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity.'I"s Amicus briefs came
pouring in-from the Crown Heights Coalition to the City of Atlanta to
the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium-most of which
urged the Supreme Court to set aside Chief Justice Heffernan's handiwork
and uphold the constitutionality of the Wisconsin statute.26 The United
States government entered the case on behalf of Wisconsin, also urging
the Court to reject Mitchell's constitutional challenge and reverse the
decision of Wisconsin's highest court.27 For his representation in the
Supreme Court, Mitchell turned to a distinguished member of the
Wisconsin State Legislature-so distinguished that earlier this year he
became the newest member of the Wisconsin delegation of federal
judges-who in turn brought on for assistance in writing the brief the
Wisconsin native who had authored the law review article that had so
captured the imagination of Chief Justice Heffernan. 21
21.
See id. at 190-91, 485 N.W.2d at 823.
22.
See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
23.
Writing for the Supreme Court in reversing the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
Chief Justice Rehnquist cites California, Florida, Montana, and Vermont as states that
opted to follow the Wisconsin approach of penalty enhancement. See Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 483 n.4 (1993).
24.
See id.
25.
Id. (quoting the Hate Crimes Statistics Act, 28 U.S.C. § 534 (Supp. I
1988)).
26.
See id.

27.
28.

See id. at 477.
See Brief of Respondent, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (No.

92-515).
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At oral argument, Justices Scalia and Kennedy peppered Todd
Mitchell's lawyer with much the same concern that had been voiced in
dissent by Justice Bablitch: Why is the Wisconsin penalty enhancer
constitutionally different from a generation of anti-discrimination laws
beginning with Title VII?29 Seven weeks later it became clear that the
Justices did not believe an adequate reply had been forthcoming.
In a brief and (to some prognosticators surprisingly) unanimous
opinion delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that nothing
in the First Amendment prevents state or federal governments from
enhancing the punishment they dole out to convicted criminals who select
the objects of their crime on the basis of a protected status.30 Overall,
the tone and construction of the Supreme Court's decision revealed that
the nine Justices in Washington thought the case simpler and the statute
less troublesome than the seven justices in Wisconsin. Picking up on
Justice Bablitch's point, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted the similarities
between the new penalty enhancer and Title V11 3 ' and noted further that
the Court had rejected the argument that Title VII unconstitutionally
infringed on the First Amendment rights of employers.32 Picking up on
Justice Abrahamson's point, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that at
bottom the statute punishes the act of discriminatory selection, not some
abstract thought or belief. 33 As to Chief Justice Heffernan's point that
the penalty enhancer will chill the expression of bigoted but protected
speech, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed serious doubts that a citizen of
Wisconsin would go through life suppressing his bigoted opinions out of
fear that should he ever commit a crime covered by the statute the
opinions will come in at trial to establish that he intentionally selected his
victim on the basis of the victim's protected status.'
In short, the
29.

Arguments Before the Court, 61 U.S.L.W. 3725, 3726 (Apr. 27, 1993).

30.
See Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 490. Including footnotes and case history, Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court runs fewer than twelve pages in the United
States Reports. See id. at 479-90.
31.
See id. at 487.
32.
See id. (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984)).
33.
See Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487-88 ("[Tlhe statute in this case is aimed at
conduct unprotected by the First Amendment. Moreover, [the statute is directed at
conduct] thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm.").
34.
As Chief Justice Rehnquist observed:
We must conjure up a vision of a Wisconsin citizen suppressing his unpopular
bigoted opinions for fear that if he later commits an offense covered by the
statute, these opinions will be offered at trial to establish that he selected his
victim on account of the victim's protected status, thus qualifying him for
penalty enhancement. .

.

. This is simply too speculative a hypothesis to

support Mitchell's overbreadth claim.
Id. at 488-89.
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Supreme Court's opinion reflects a Court that viewed Todd Mitchell's
case through the prism of federalism rather than through the prism of the
First Amendment, with its principal theme being that states have
enormous authority to fix (through their legislatures) and impose (through
their courts) criminal punishment. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist
reached all the way back to Blackstone's Commentaries to support the
conclusion, observing that "'it is but reasonable that among crimes of
different natures those should be most severely punished, which are the
most destructive of the public safety and happiness.'"'
II. STRUGGLING WITH DISCRIMINATORY HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS

At approximately the same time in 1987 that the Wisconsin
Legislature triggered the events that would culminate in Todd Mitchell's
landmark case, events unfolding elsewhere in the state would thrust
Wisconsin into the forefront of yet another hot-button First Amendment
controversy. This time, the First Amendment flag would be waved not
on behalf of convicted criminal defendants who claimed they had the
constitutional freedom to select their victims on the basis of race, but
instead on behalf of undergraduate students at public institutions who
claimed they had the constitutional freedom to harass their peers with
racist, sexist, and homophobic expression.
The past decade has posed unprecedented challenges for those who
govern and administer our nation's campuses. Demographic realities, a
culture that encourages individual and group self-consciousness, and
pressure from constituencies on and off campus combine to create a
student population that is more genuinely diverse, and in more ways, than
ever before. But this increasing diversity, despite the unmistakable
benefits it brings to a campus, increases the prospects for intimidation,
mean-spiritedness, and cruelty.
On a campus in Connecticut, a student posts a sign outside her
dormitory door that reads "homos [will be] shot on sight."3 6 At a
California law school, an African-American student returns to her
dormitory room; posted on the door of her room is an insulting caricature
of a person of her racial heritage with a red line slashed through the
picture." On an Alabama campus, students greet the crowning of an
African-American homecoming queen by booing and waving confederate
35.
Id. at 488 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *16).
36.
Robert A. Frahm, UConn Decides to Retain Ban Against 'Fighting Words'in
Student Code, HARTFORD COURANT, June 15, 1991, at BI.
37.
See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the

Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2320 n.2 (1989). A series of incidents along this
line is reported to have taken place on law school campuses in California.
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flags.38 In Rhode Island, a student in the midst of celebrating his
twenty-first birthday stands in a dormitory courtyard and shouts offensive
characterizations of African-Americans, gays, and Jews; as he finishes his
alcohol-induced tirade, he turns to an African-American woman and
boasts "[m ]y parents own you people." 39 Late one night on the campus
of a prestigious Pennsylvania university, a group of African-American
women are making noise outside a dormitory; a white student opens his
dormitory window and yells down at the women: "Shut up, you water
buffalo. "'

Similar events were unfolding on and around campuses throughout
the University of Wisconsin System, especially in Madison.4 One
fraternity sponsored a "Fiji Island" party for which it erected a fifteenfoot high caricature of a dark-skinned man with a bone through his nose;
fraternity members in black-face paraded around in what one observer
called "tropical garb." 4" Shortly thereafter, members of the same
fraternity crashed another fraternity's party, triggering fisticuffs and an
exchange of racial and religious slurs.43 A year later, the fraternity
whose party had been crashed sponsored an off-campus "slave auction"
fund-raiser at which pledges in black-face and donned with Afro wigs
performed skits impersonating African-American entertainers." On yet
another occasion, a fraternity held a party featuring a "Harlem Room" in
which it served fried chicken and watermelon punch, and members again
painted in black-face.45
These incidents represent only a smattering of a boundless number
like them that erupted on campuses over the past decade. The incidents,
here in Wisconsin and elsewhere, served to anger and isolate minority
students, exacerbate tensions among students and student groups, and call
38.
See 200 ProtestRacism at University of Ala., ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 1,
1989, at A4.
39.
Kenneth J. Cooper, Speech Code at Issue in Brown Case; University's Move
to Expel Student Raises Legal Questions, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1991, at A4.
40.
Linda Seebach, Nominee Hackney Ducks Tough Calls, HARRISBURG PATRIOT,
June 30, 1993, at A9.
41.
For a useful account of the evolution of the University of Wisconsin's antiharassment policy, see Patricia B. Hodulik, Prohibiting Discriminatory Harassmentby
Regulating Student Speech: A Balancing of First-Amendment and University Interests, 16
J.C. & U.L. 573, 574-75 (1990). Richard Delgado has described in admirable detail the

incidents summarized in this paragraph, incidents that fueled the momentum that led to
the UW Rule. See Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: ConstitutionalNarratives
in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343, 355-58 (1991).
42.
43.

Delgado, supra note 41, at 355.
See id. at 356.

44.

See id. at 357.

45.

See Hodulik, supra note 41, at 574.
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into question the willingness and capacity of American universities to
control their communities and fulfill their educational missions. 46 As a
result, a strikingly similar pattern of response unfolded on campus after
campus around the nation. Time and again, on campus after campus,
administrators, faculty, and students put their heads together and
concluded that a good deal needed to be done to make the particular
campus a safer, more secure place. Time and again, on campus after
campus, a committee with representatives from all the appropriate campus
constituencies was appointed and charged with coming up with solutions
for what ailed the campus. Time and again, on campus after campus, the
committee did so, recommending a laundry list of actions the university
needed to undertake if it hoped to improve the atmosphere on campus,
especially if it wanted to continue to attract and retain qualified minority
students. And time and again, on campus after campus, the course of its
discussions led the committee to take a probing look at the rules and
regulations that govern student conduct.
What universities all across the nation discovered was that some truly
reprehensible student conduct was going unregulated, falling between the
cracks. In short, on campus after campus, those who govern and
administer were told that their institutions had not responded effectively
to acts of harassment (some egregious, some not) in part because there
were no rules in place to prohibit such harassment or to empower the
university to do much of anything in response to it. Plagiarism, cheating
on examinations, stealing property-plenty of rules and regulations
governed these breaches of the educational community. But an entire
range of student conduct equally or more harmful to the community was
being left unchecked. In particular, the kind of racial, sexual, and
religious harassment that Congress forbids in the workplace under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act simply was not regulated on campus.
Here in Wisconsin, the Board of Regents and the Madison campus
of the University of Wisconsin took the lead in working through these
issues for the University of Wisconsin System.47 Among other things,
the Board of Regents requested each campus in the University of
Wisconsin System to craft policies that would address discriminatory
harassment by students, faculty, and staff.4" At approximately the same
time, the Madison committee came forward with its proposal to amend
the student conduct rules to forbid discriminatory harassment. 49 Over
the next several months, and with the assistance of some talented law
46.
See Delgado, supra note 41; Hodulik, supra note 41.
tempestuous consequences ignited by the Madison events.
47.
See Hodulik, supra note 41, at 575.

48.
49.

See id.
See id.
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professors from the University of Wisconsin Law School, the Board of
Regents developed, refined, and adopted the following amendment to
Chapter 17 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code:
UWS 17.06 Offenses defined. The university may
discipline a student in nonacademic matters in the following
situations.

(2)(a) For racist or discriminatory comments, epithets
or other expressive behavior directed at a individual or on
separate occasions at different individuals, or for physical
conduct, if such comments, epithets, other expressive
behavior or physical conduct intentionally:
1. Demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed,
disability, sexual orientation, national origin, ancestry or age
of the individual or individuals; and
2.
Create an intimidating, hostile or demeaning
environment for education, university-related work, or other
university-authorized activity.
(b) Whether the intent required under par. (a) is
present shall be determined by consideration of all relevant
circumstances.5 0
The Rule took effect on University of Wisconsin campuses across the
state in September 1989, just a few weeks prior to the events outside the
Kenosha apartment building that thrust Wisconsin into one political and
constitutional debate that spanned the nation. And the Rule would put the
State in the crossfire of an even more intensive cultural and constitutional
conversation. The terms of the conversation would come to be controlled
not by the university administrators whose campuses gave rise to it and
who had experienced it up close and personal, but instead by those who
wished to speak about everything except the realities of student-on-student
harassment on campus in late twentieth-century America. Indeed, the
national conversation took on all the earmarks of a book club meeting in
which those who spoke loudest and most vigorously and issued the most

50.

Wis.

ADMIN. CODE § UWS

17.06 (Aug. 1992).
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scathing reviews of the book turn out not to have bothered to read it at
all.
In early 1990, six months after the regulation took effect, a group of
students filed a lawsuit in federal district court in Milwaukee seeking a
declaratory judgment that the regulation was inconsistent with (among
other things) the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech."
By this time, the regulation had begun to be enforced on some UW
campuses around the state. At UW-Eau Claire, for instance, a student
had sent an electronic mail message that stated "Death to all Arabs!! Die
Islamic scumbags!" to an Iranian faculty member. 2 The university
reprimanded the student and placed him on probation for the remainder
of a semester. 3 By the time Judge Warren issued his decision a year
and a half later, however, the University of Wisconsin would be told that
the First Amendment disabled it from doing essentially anything at all
about this or a wide variety of other acts of discriminatory harassment on
its campuses.
In Judge Warren's court, the Board of Regents made three principal
arguments in its effort to defend the constitutionality of the Rule.
First, it contended that expression outlawed by the Rule constituted
unprotected speech, fell into a category of unprotected speech referred to
for half a century as "fighting words."'
Judge Warren rejected the
argument, and for a fascinating reason. He observed-correctly-that, as
the fighting words doctrine has evolved, a central element of it has been
that the expression must tend to provoke a breach of the peace, a violent
reaction, in the individual to whom the speech is addressed. 5
Nevertheless, he proceeded to conclude that because not all students
throughout the University of Wisconsin System victimized by racist or
sexist harassment would be undisciplined enough to respond with
fisticuffs, the harassment itself must be constitutionally protected.56 In

51.
See UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1164 (E.D.
Wis. 1991).
52.
See id. at 1168.

53.

See id.

54.
See Defendant's Combined Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, UWM Post,
Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (No. 90-C-328)
[hereinafter Defendant's Combined Brief] ("[Tmhe rule's constitutionality flows logically
and naturally from the fact that, as formulated and applied, it simply does not venture
beyond the safe harbor of the Chaplinsky fighting words doctrine.").
55.
See UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1170-72.
56.
Judge Warren noted:
It is unlikely that all or nearly all demeaning, discriminatory comments,
epithets or other expressive behavior which creates an intimidating, hostile or
demeaning environment tends to provoke a violent response. Since the UW
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short, the speculative maturity and discipline of those who would be
subject to racist and sexist harassment was used by Judge Warren as an
argument that the harassment itself must be constitutionally protected.
Strike One for the UW Rule.
Second, the Board of Regents contended that the category of
expression outlawed by the Rule-discriminatory harassment such as the
Eau Claire student's e-mail to the Iranian professor-fit nicely alongside
the host of other unprotected categories of speech established by the
Supreme Court as unprotected, such as fighting words, obscenity, false
statements about public officials made with malice, and the like.5 7 To
this Judge Warren delivered a classic "It's Not My Job" reply, declaring
that he-a mere federal district judge out of Milwaukee-had no authority
to tinker with First Amendment law.5" That, he suggested, was a job
for the nine justices in Washington, and for them alone. Strike Two for
the UW Rule.
Third, the Board of Regents argued that the UW Rule must be
consistent with the First Amendment because the category of expression
outlawed under the Rule is essentially outlawed in the employment setting
under Title VII, and no one had seriously maintained that the First
Amendment should be construed to invalidate Title VII.59 Well, said
Judge Warren, the employment setting is not the educational setting.60
And besides, he added, agency law can make employers liable for the
actions of their employees but universities are not liable for actions of
their students.61 Strike Three for the UW Rule.
Unlike Todd Mitchell's case, this one went no further-no appeal to
the Seventh Circuit, no journey to the nation's highest court in
Washington. Yet in many respects the events that unfolded in Wisconsin
concerning the UW anti-harassment rule have had as substantial an impact
on a contentious First Amendment issue as did Todd Mitchell's decision
from the nation's highest court. Universities-public and private, those
Rule covers a substantial number of situations where no breach of the peace
is likely to result, the rule fails to meet the requirements of the fighting words

doctrine.
Id. at 1173.
57.
See Defendant's Combined Brief at 21-27, UWM Post (No. 90-C-328).
58.
See UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1173 ("Mhe Chaplinsky Court did not state
that lower courts should employ a balancing approach to identify additional categories of
speech undeserving of protection.").
59.
See Defendant's Combined Brief at 47-48, UWM Post (No. 90-C-328).
60.
See UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1177 ("Title VII addresses employment, not
educational, settings.").

61.
See id. at 1177 ("[A]gency theory would generally not hold a school liable
for its students' actions since students normally are not agents of the school.").
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subject to First Amendment constraints and those not-find themselves
trapped in a whipsaw, on the one hand pressured to take a strong stand
against harassment on their campuses while on the other mocked
mercilessly and threatened to be dragged into court each time they
exercise the courage to do so. Distorted rhetoric from cultural icons
ranging from George Will and William F. Buckley to Arthur Schlesinger,
Jr. and Nat Hentoff has put universities on the defensive and helped
transform the cowards and hate-mongers on campus into appealing
rogues, late twentieth-century equivalents of Bonnie & Clyde or Butch
Cassidy & Sundance.1 Judge Warren's decision, along with one from
a federal court in Michigan,' continue to serve as evidentiary exhibits
in a national trial taking place from one coast to the other, introduced into
evidence in conversation after conversation, newspaper article after
newspaper article. For now, the nation's universities seem to be losing
that national trial.
The reason they are losing is not because their position is weak,
either on the facts unfolding on campuses around the nation or on the law
of the First Amendment. Instead, the reason universities are losing is that
they have failed in the most fundamental of lawyering skills: they have
failed in their effort to frame the issue. The question in this national trial
has turned out to be not whether many of the acts of harassment taking
place on the nation's campuses are reprehensible and worthy of discipline,
and not whether universities have the institutional obligation to make their
communities safe for all their students. Were the national conversation
framed in these terms universities would likely prevail. Instead, the
question posed increasingly has turned out to be whether the folks in
62.
In California, for instance, a provision in the state education code that has
come to be called the "Leonard Law" eviscerates the difference between public and
private universities by imposing constitutional constraints on otherwise private postsecondary educational institutions. As a result, a California state court has held that
Stanford University may not enforce its anti-harassment policy. See Michael S. Greve,
Forcing Free Speech, 27 REASON 56, 56 (1995).
63.
See, e.g., William F. Buckley, Sorting Out College 'Rights,' SAN DIEGO
UNION-T~iB., Mar. 17, 1991, at C2; Nat Hentoff, Chilling Codes, WASH. POST, Mar.

25, 1995, at A19; William H. Honan, SchlesingerSees Free Speech in Peril, N.Y. TIMES,
May 27, 1994, at BI (reporting historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s valedictory to City
College of New York in which the historian lambasted campus anti-harassment efforts as
"the agitation for censorship in the name of multiculturalism"); George Will, A Dangerous
Argument for Conformity, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 29, 1993, at 7B (criticizing
feminist academic Catherine MacKinnon for leading "the most radical assault on free
speech in American history" by opposing pornography and advocating curbs on sexist
speech on campus).
64.
See Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
(invalidating principally on vagueness grounds the University of Michigan anti-harassment
rule).
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charge of our nation's campuses have sometimes gone too far in their
efforts, sometimes allowed their zeal for justice to be misconstrued as a
conspiracy to repress unpopular ideas. On that issue the jury of our peers
has come back with a guilty verdict. As a result, thanks in no small part
to Judge Warren's decision, many continue to read the First Amendment
to require that the bathwater of anti-harassment provisions be tossed out.
With that bathwater goes some of the baby of safety, security, and
support that universities are obligated to provide their students.
III. GRAPPLING WITH RELIGIOUS INSIGNIA ON MUNICIPAL SEALS
The final episode in this First Amendment trilogy unfolds in a suburb
west of Milwaukee by the name of Wauwatosa. This final episode serves
to remind us of the awesome power of the First Amendment to unsettle
long-standing traditions within our nation's communities.
One day in 1990 a fellow by the name of Rob Sherman from Buffalo
6
Grove, Illinois dropped in to visit with Wauwatosa's City Attorney.
It quickly became apparent that the visit had been prompted less by social
niceties than by professional concerns. Sherman happened to be the
Midwest Regional Director of an organization called American Atheists,
Inc. It turns out that Sherman's brief visit with the City Attorney would
catapult this quiet, conservative, Republican 66 community with a
substantial Catholic population into a First Amendment frenzy from which
it has not yet fully recovered.
Back in 1956, Wauwatosa's Suburban Women's Club sponsored an
art contest for the purpose of designing a municipal emblem and flag for
the community.67 The Club selected as the winning entry the submission
of a nine-year-old girl by the name of Suzanne Vallier. The following
year the Common Council-the City's governing body-officially adopted
the artwork as its municipal emblem and flag. The purpose of Rob
65.
See Harold D. Gehrke, Summary of the Creation and History of the City's
Logo (undated, unpaginated memorandum on file with author) [hereinafter Gehrke
Memorandum]. Most of the factual information recounted in the following pages has been
pieced together from the public sources cited throughout these pages. In addition, my
research concerning the Wauwatosa episode has benefitted substantially from the kind
assistance of Harold Gehrke, the recently retired Wauwatosa City Attorney. Mr. Gehrke
has made his materials available to me and the students in my Advanced Issues in the First
Amendment seminar.
66.
In 1992 and again in 1996, while the nation was going for Clinton/Gore,

Wauwatosa went for Bush/Quayle and Dole/Kemp. WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE
BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 1993-1994, at 944 (1993); WISCONSIN
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 1997-1998, at 929
(1997).
67.

See Gehrke Memorandum, supra note 65.
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Sherman's visit to Wauwatosa City Hall thirty-four years later was to
inform Wauwatosa officials that this municipal seal-which the City had
been using on its street signs, stationery, police vehicles, and assorted
other municipal paraphernalia since 1957-was illegal. In particular,
Sherman informed the City that the presence of a Latin cross in the lower
right quadrant of the emblem violated the First Amendment's antiestablishment guarantee.0 He demanded that the City promptly remove
the cross from the logo and suggested that he would drag the City into
court should it refuse to comply with his demand.

68.

See id.
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Sherman's march through Wauwatosa that day was no isolated event.
At the same time, two communities in Illinois-Zion and Rolling
Meadows-already were embroiled in litigation with Sherman and his
organization over their municipal seals. Because of these pending cases,
Wauwatosa's elected officials decided to defer action for awhile and await
the rulings of a federal appellate court in Chicago before deciding how to
respond to Sherman's demand. Two years later, in early 1992, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit told these
municipalities that the First Amendment's anti-establishment guarantee
rendered their emblems unconstitutional.' The Supreme Court of the
United States declined to review the cases, and several months later
denied the municipalities' request to reconsider the earlier denial in light
of an intervening decision by the Fifth Circuit that came to the opposite
conclusion in a case concerning the emblem of the city of Austin,
Texas.' As a result, Sherman returned to Wauwatosa in the spring of
1992 to increase the pressure.
Wauwatosa's City Attorney responded by preparing a legal opinion
for the Mayor and Common Council. That opinion reluctantly concluded
that Wauwatosa's seal could not withstand attack in the Seventh Circuit
so long as the High Court's controversial Lemon test remained the law of
the First Amendment. 7 In addition, the City Attorney stated publicly
that his ethical obligations as a lawyer-including the obligation under
Chapter 20 of the Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules to refrain from filing
frivolous pleadings and the similar demands of Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure-prevented him from defending the
constitutionality of the seal because doing so could threaten his license to
practice law and subject him to financial sanctions.2 Not surprisingly,
69.
See Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1991). In particular, a
divided panel of the Seventh Circuit held that the Rolling Meadows seal failed the second
prong of Lemon by having the effect of endorsing Christianity, while the Zion seal,
emblem, and logo posed even more substantial Lemon problems under both the purpose
and effect prongs. See id. at 1411-15.
70.
See Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991). In Murray, a
divided panel of the Fifth Circuit-explicitly distinguishing its situation from that of Zion
and Rolling Meadows-rejected the argument that what it dubbed a "Christian cross" on
the municipal insignia of Austin clashed with federal constitutional principles. See id. at
150-57.
71.
See Memorandum from Harold D. Gehrke, City Attorney, to Maricolette
Walsh, Mayor, Constitutionality of the Cross on the City Logo (Sept. 29, 1992) (on file

with author).
72.
See Tyler Chin, Officials Decline Offerfor Help on Emblem, MILWAUKEE J.,
Nov. 14, 1992, at A22 ("'We would certainly lose and we would be ordered to pay
attorney fees'" for the other side, Gehrke said. "'As an attorney, ethically, it would be
inappropriate to enter a frivolous defense.'").

HeinOnline -- 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 877 1998

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
these statements prompted religious organizations from around the nation
to inform Wauwatosa that they would be delighted to undertake defending
the seal if the City Attorney chose to opt out.7 As the collective blood
pressure of Wauwatosans continued to rise, the issue was placed on the
agenda for a November 1992 public hearing and a Common Council
meeting several weeks later. 4
The public hearing attracted a sizable number of residents. Most
who attended expressed outrage that an outsider had come into their
community and set in motion a chain of events that threatened to force a
change in the City's official seal.7' Nonetheless, the Common Council's
Public and Municipal Affairs Committee voted to recommend that, given
the state of First Amendment law, the logo be re-designed and the cross
deleted from the new design.76 A week later the full Common Council
agreed.77 In each instance members cited their duties to uphold the state
and federal constitutions and the tensions that spring from the clash of
those oaths with the wishes of what appeared to be the vast majority of
Wauwatosa residents. As something of a compromise gesture and a
symbol of constitutional civil disobedience, the Common Council also
recommended that the portion of the emblem previously occupied by the
cross be replaced with a plain red square, preserving the option of
returning the cross to the logo should the First Amendment law governing
municipal insignia change.78
But the story does not end here. Wauwatosa residents were
displeased with this resolution.79 Over the next few months petitions
sped around the City; by early 1993 more than 7500 impassioned
Wauwatosans were urging the Common Council to submit the matter to
73.
One such volunteer was Liberties Counsel, an organization based in Orlando,
Florida that described itself as "a non-profit religious civil liberties education and legal
defense organization." Id. Mathew Staver, president of Liberties Counsel, extended the
offer to have his organization represent Wauwatosa free of charge. See id.
74.
See John Diedrich, Hundreds Swamp Meeting in Tosa to Support Cross,
MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Nov. 25, 1992, at 4A.

75.
See id.
76.
See Bill Meyer, Committee Votes to Alter Seal, 6-2, WAUWATOSA NEWSTIMES, Dec. 10, 1992, at 1.
77.
See Betsy Thatcher, At Cross Purposes:Atheist Won Battle, Not Hearts, in
Tosa, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Dec. 17, 1992, at 8A (noting that the full Common Council
voted 10-5 to remove the cross from the logo).
78.
See Gehrke Memorandum, supra note 65, observing that: "This was
intentionally done so that the cross could be returned to the emblem if, in the future, the
U.S. Supreme Court should change the interpretation so as to allow religious symbolism
to exist on municipal emblems."
79.
See Lawrence Sussman, Group to Start Drive to Restore Tosa Cross,
MILWAUKEE J., Apr. 30, 1993, at B5.
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voters in a referendum.'

Thus, in April 1994, Wauwatosa voters faced

two ballot questions. Question One was whether the City shall reinstate
the cross on the emblem."' Question Two was whether the City shall
defend any legal challenge to the reinstatement of the cross of the emblem
regardless of the cost to taxpayers.8 2 Voters answered each question in
the affirmative,83 surprising public officials who had predicted that,

when push came to shove, taxpayers would not opt to put their money
where their mouths were.
Again, however, the plot thickened. On the advice of the City
Attorney, the Common Council chose to treat the referendum as advisory

Accordingly, it concluded that it was not
rather than decisional.'
legally bound by the results of the referendum. Several months of
haggling and parliamentary shenanigans followed. The Cross Committee
insisted that the cross be returned to the logo, citing both the results of
the referendum and a recent decision from a federal judge in Oklahoma
holding that religious insignia on municipal seals did not offend the First
Amendment.' Rob Sherman and his organization threatened to haul the
City into court.8 6 The Mayor, seeking to accommodate her constituents
while respecting the Constitution, proposed a compromise in which the
cross would be returned to the emblem and the emblem officially retired,
See Sandy Schurter, Signatures Secured, Cross Issue Sent to City,
NEWS-TIMES, June 17, 1993, at 1 (noting that nearly three times the number
of signatures necessary to trigger a referendum initiative had been obtained by the
Wauwatosa Cross Committee).
81.
See Tyler Chin, Wauwatosa Puts Cross Issue to Public Vote, MILWAUKEE J.,
Aug. 4, 1993, at B3.
82.
See id.
On Question One the vote was 9100 in favor and 3344 opposed. On Question
83.
Two the vote was 7113 in favor and 5156 opposed. See David Thome, Voters Want
Cross Back on Tosa Seal, MILWAUKEE J., Apr. 6, 1994, at BI.
As City Attorney Gehrke explained in a letter to Mayor Walsh, neither a
84.
decision of a federal appellate court-in this case the controlling Seventh Circuit decision,
see supra note 69-nor a resolution of the Common Council can be overturned or repealed
by "direct legislation," that is to say, by referendum. See Letter from Harold D. Gehrke,
City Attorney, to Maricolette Walsh, Mayor (May 21, 1993) (on file with author).
A federal court in Oklahoma upheld the power of the Oklahoma City suburb
85.
of Edmond to display a Latin cross in one quadrant of the city's emblem. See Robinson
v. City of Edmond, No. CIV-93-153-R (W.D. Okla. 1994). But the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed on appeal. Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68
F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1702 (1996).
86.
Speaking from Wauwatosa City Hall on the evening of the vote, Sherman
stated: "The civil rights of atheists are not for sale . . . .If the National Civil Rights
Foundation has to go to court over this issue, we will make it so expensive for Wauwatosa
that the residents will be paying for it the rest of their lives." Joe Williams & Jay
Erickson, Tosa Voters Want Cross on Emblem; Paying for Fight Gets Less Support,
MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Apr. 6,1994, at IA.
80.

WAUWATOSA
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to hang prominently in Wauwatosa's municipal hall.87 The proposal
garnered little support.
When the dust settled, the Common Council cut a deal with Rob
Sherman and American Atheists:88 The City agreed to remove the cross
from the logo featured just about everywhere, except on the 4,800 blue
street signs throughout the City, most of which were relatively new and
would cost a good deal to replace. In a final twist, the Common Council
chose to place the familiar words "In God We Trust" in the lower right
quadrant of the newly designed logo, both as a substitute for the cross and
as a way of preserving the notion that Wauwatosa was, and remains, a
community of religious people, the notion that the City continues to have
what one alderman referred to as a "spiritual base." 89 The Common
Council's choice of the words "In God We Trust" was no accident: It
figured that if the First Amendment does not prohibit those words from
being placed on our currency it does not prohibit them from being placed
on a municipal logo.
But bitterness and resentment lingered. A year and a half later, in
early 1996, the once extremely popular Mayor came within 184 votes of
losing her re-election bid to a candidate whose two principal initiatives
were the return of the cross to the logo and the offer of free doughnuts
and coffee to anyone stopping by his office on Thursdays.' And in July
1997, Rob Sherman and American Atheists rode into Oconto County to
deliver a message to the Oconto County Board. The message was that he
would file a lawsuit against the Board should it approve the recent
proposal of the Christian Family Association that the Ten Commandments
be hung in the courthouse, part of the Association's initiative to get the
87.

See Joe Williams, Mayor Wants Cross Temporarily Put on Emblem,

MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, May 28, 1994, at 8A. Milwaukee's largest daily newspaper put
its editorial weight behind Mayor Walsh's proposal. See A Smart Compromise on Tosa
Cross, MILWAUKEE J., June 1, 1994, at 10.

88.
See Tyler L. Chin, 'In God We Trust' Approved for Disputed Tosa Emblem;
CouncilReaches Compromisein Debateto Restore Crosson Symbol, MILWAUKEE J., June

8, 1994, at 1.
89.

Jamaal Abdul-Alim, Tosa Council Rejects Cross; Votes to Add Phrase to

Emblem, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, June 8, 1994, at IA.
90.
Mayor Walsh-calling the campaign "'one of the most unsavory campaigns

in my memory'"-attributed the closeness of the vote to opposition from the Cross
Committee. Municipalities:Bell Easily Elected West Allis Mayor; Wauwatosa's Walsh,
South Milwaukee's Kieck Re-elected to Posts, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 20, 1996,
at 4 (noting that Mayor Walsh "narrowly survived" against a candidate she outspent by
a margin of three to one).
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commandments displayed in all 72 county courthouses throughout the
state. 91
IV. CONCLUSION

On the surface, it would appear that no neat and seamless thread
binds together these three First Amendment episodes. In one, the nation's
highest court turns back a challenge to efforts by states to punish more
severely criminal conduct that the states have deemed especially
destructive. In another, a federal trial court in Milwaukee informs the
nation's public universities that a central element of their efforts to
discourage discriminatory harassment on campus cannot square with
current understandings of the breadth of free speech. In the third, a
community learns that a time-honored emblem from which many of its
residents derived a sense of pride and distinctiveness must be redesigned
to take account of the latest developments in the jurisprudence of the antiestablishment guarantee.
Yet, beneath the surface, the episodes remind us of the powerful
impact Wisconsin and its communities continue to have on the evolution
and practical meaning of the law of the First Amendment. Todd
Mitchell's case out of Kenosha is likely to be cited for generations as the
case that liberated those who make and enforce state and federal criminal
laws from the contention that a criminal has the constitutional freedom to
select his or her victim because of the color of the victim's skin. The
University of Wisconsin's unsuccessful defense of its anti-harassment rule
has played a pivotal role in placing our nation's universities on the
defensive in their efforts to prevent hate from polluting the American
campus. Wauwatosa's effort to preserve a municipal logo against the
charge that it impermissibly endorsed Christianity underscores the
significance the First Amendment can have on the deeply rooted traditions
of a community. Regardless of the competing perspectives individual
Wisconsinites bring to each of these constitutional experiences, together
we can take pride in the contributions our state has made, and continues
to make, 92 to the development of First Amendment law.
See Meg Jones, Illinois Atheist Threatens Suit; He Appears Before Oconto
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 18, 1997, at 1;
Atheist Threatens Lawsuit-Ten Commandments Effort Opposed, Wis. ST. J., July 19,
1997, at 5B.
92.
The constitutionality of religious school choice is the most prominent example
of the central role Wisconsin continues to play in the evolution of First Amendment law.
Shortly before this Article went to prss, the Wisconsin Supreme Court handed down a
much-awaited decision in which the court's four-person majority held that the amended
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program-which allows otherwise eligible families to use state
91.

County Board over Ten Commandments,
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funds to send their children to religious schools-does not clash with state or federal
constitutional protections for religious liberty. See Jackson v. Benson, No. 97-0270 (Wis.
June 10, 1998).
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